Towards Consistency and the Scientific in Economics by Robin Pope
 
 














































  Bonn Graduate School of Economics 
  Department of Economics 
  University of Bonn 
  Kaiserstrasse 1 
  D-53113 Bonn
 
Discussion Paper 15/2009 
 

















































  Financial support by the 
  Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 
  through the 
  Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) 
  is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
  Deutsche Post World Net is a sponsor of the BGSE. Towards Consistency and the Scientific in Economics 
Robin Pope*, University of Bonn**   
 
 
Neoclassical  economics  rests  on  1)  maximising  something;  2)  the  something  maximised  is  the 
expectation of the NM (von Neumann Morgenstern) utility function; and 3) avoiding asking people 
how they choose, but inferring everything of relevance from their actual choices.  This article outlines 
why we need to ditch these three features in order to edge economics towards being a science.   
 
First, it is here shown that nearly every mainstream economist younger than 80 years old repudiates the 
NM utility function as both implausible and irrational.  These younger than 80-year old mainstreamers 
call what they do expected utility theory only because they are ignorant, and unwittingly contradict 
what von Neumann and Morgenstern, Paul Samuelson and others said in the 1920s to early 1950s in 
explaining the constraints that this NM function imposes on how outcomes map into utilities.  To begin 
to be a science, economics cannot have in its core such flagrant contradictions between what current 
mainstreamers imagine is the utility function that they employ in their theoretical and empirical work 
and what that utility function actually permits.  What that NM utility mapping excludes needs to get 
recognised.  Until that is done, there is no scope for a modern economist – even if he allows for 
context, framing and individual differences effects  – to assess whether expected utility theory has 
empirical or prescriptive or normative support. 
 
Second,  it  is  here  shown  that  the  maximising  concept  is  fraught  with  inconsistencies  when  not 
empirically vacuous.  When the maximising is with respect to expected profits or expected utility, it is 
empirically vacuous, since no economist can specify the maximum, and hence lacks a base from which 
to start considering evidence of whether a given firm or household attains it.  The maximising concept 
needs to be replaced by a set of concepts that can be connected to real world events.  The more modest 
notion of an improvement needs to replace the grandiose notion of a maximum.  
 
Third it is shown that there is an un-noticed problem in modern mainstream economists' admirable 
efforts to be scientific by inferring people's utility decision procedures exclusively from their choices is 
too restrictive.  The exclusion derives from a belief that the introspection of lay people is too unreliable 
to have any relevance.  Indeed as mainstream economics recognises, lay people, being humans, are 
fallible.    The  un-noticed  problem  is  that  this  leaves  a  gap.    Whose  testimony  is  infallible?    By 
implication, it is the mainstream economist who writes out the maximising equations detailing that 
people maximise their expected utility.  Filling the gap with such divine unquestionable authority is 
unsatisfactory.    A  reasonable  position  has  to  admit  fallibilities  from  bias  and  ignorance  in  the 
mainstream  economist's  introspections,  not  merely  in  the  introspection  of  others,  and  use  normal 
scientific procedures for dealing with likely mistakes and biasses in data – not wholesale discard of 
some data, and unquestioning acceptance of other data. 
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